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From 16 to 19 June 2025, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) hosted a regional workshop in Stockholm on “Methods and Tools for Evidence-Based Public Health (EBPH),” as part of the EU Initiative on Health Security.

ECDC has issued a Rapid Risk Assessment in response to a multi-country outbreak of hepatitis A in the EU/EEA.

The World Health Organization (WHO) today released new guidance to help countries adopt and expand midwifery models of care - where midwives serve as the main care provider for women and babies throughout pregnancy, childbirth, and the postnatal period.

Building on lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, the WHO Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence in Berlin leverages innovative tools and collaborations for more effective disease surveillance worldwide. Just over three years after its inauguration, the Hub now supports over 150 countries in detecting health threats more effectively and rapidly. The Hub’s latest annual report highlights the growing impact of this work and provides key insights into progress made in 2024.

The Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) and the World Health Organization (WHO) today signed a new agreement and contribution of €5.25 million to support key WHO initiatives on universal health coverage, environmental health and emergency medical response.

“Spain has long been a strong and steadfast partner to WHO and global health," said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General. "We thank Spain for its increased flexible funding of our work, in doing so helping WHO be stronger and more independent and allowing us to deliver the services that countries and communities need from us.”

This year, Spain’s commitment to global health entered a new chapter as it returned to the WHO Executive Board for the 2025–2028 term, nearly two decades since its last membership. This renewed engagement is supported by the country’s new Global Health Strategy, launched on 27 May 2025.

This is underscored by today’s signing of a new agreement between Spain, and WHO and a growing collaboration between both partners. At the heart of this effort is the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), under the leadership of Mr Antón Leis; AECID has significantly stepped up flexible and strategic funding for WHO activities.

AECID's €5.25 million contribution to WHO is part of a broader €60 million pledge announced by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in November 2024. Spain’s multi-year commitment also includes support for critical health programmes in countries such as Jordan, Mali, and Sudan, and global initiatives like polio eradication, patient safety, and the elimination of cervical cancer.

Looking forward, Spain will host the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) in Seville, 30 June–3 July 2025, where it aims to elevate health financing as a core development priority. A high-level special event – co-sponsored by WHO and featuring leaders from global health, finance, and academia – will call for bold action through the “Health financing for a safe and sustainable economy: towards Seville health financing agenda for action.”

 

ECDC is closely monitoring increasing SARS-CoV-2 activity in the EU/EEA, and the emergence of the recently identified Omicron-descendant variant NB.1.8.1 has been associated with a rise in infections in some countries in Asia, including China, Hong Kong and Singapore.

Increases in infections due to SARS-CoV-2, associated with an increase in detections of the NB.1.8.1 variant, have been observed in some countries in Asia (including China, Hong Kong, Singapore) in recent weeks. ECDC and WHO have classified NB.1.8.1 as a variant under monitoring (VUM).

From 9 to 13 June 2025, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) delivered the Rapid Risk Assessment and Survey Methods module in Athens, Greece, to fellows from the EPIET, EUPHEM, and PAE programmes. In addition, the module was offered to fellows and external participants of the MediPIET programme.

Between 10–12 June 2025, 24 representatives from the Eastern Partnership countries, from Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, gathered in Stockholm and online for a three-day workshop hosted by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), focused on simulation exercises (SimExes) and after-action reviews (AARs).

The Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), following the fourth meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) Emergency Committee regarding the upsurge of mpox 2024, held on 5 June 2025, from 12:00 to 17:00 CEST, concurs with its advice that the event continues to meet the criteria of a public health emergency of international concern and, considering the advice of the Committee, he is hereby issuing a revised set of temporary recommendations.

The WHO Director-General expresses his most sincere gratitude to the Chair, Members, and Advisors of the Committee. The proceeding of the fourth meeting of the Committee will be shared with States Parties to the IHR and published in the coming days.

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Temporary recommendations

These temporary recommendations are issued to States Parties experiencing the transmission of monkeypox virus (MPXV), including, but not limited to, those where there is sustained community transmission, and where there are clusters of cases or sporadic travel-related cases of MPXV clade Ib.

They are intended to be implemented by those States Parties in addition to the current standing recommendations for mpox, valid until 20 August 2025.

In the context of the global efforts to prevent and control the spread of mpox disease outlined in the WHO Strategic framework for enhancing prevention and control of mpox: 2024–2027, the aforementioned standing recommendations apply to all States Parties.

All current WHO interim technical guidance can be accessed on this page of the WHO website. WHO evidence-based guidance has been and will continue to be updated in line with the evolving situation, updated scientific evidence, and WHO risk assessment to support States Parties in the implementation of the WHO Strategic Framework for enhancing mpox prevention and control.

Pursuant to Article 3 Principle of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the implementation of these temporary recommendations, as well as of the standing recommendations for mpox, by States Parties shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, in line with the principles set out in Article 3 of the IHR.

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Note: The text in backets next to each temporary recommendation indicates the status with respect to the set of temporary recommendations issued on 27 November 2024.
 

Emergency coordination

• Secure political commitment and engagement to intensify mpox prevention and response efforts, including resource allocation, for the lowest administrative and operational level reporting mpox cases (hotspots) in the prior 4 weeks. (EXTENDED)

• Establish or enhance national and local emergency prevention and response coordination arrangements as recommended in the WHO Mpox global strategic preparedness and response plan (2025), and its upcoming iteration, and in line with the WHO Strategic framework for enhancing prevention and control of mpox: 2024–2027. (EXTENDED, with updated reference)

• Establish or enhance coordination among all partners and stakeholders engaged in or supporting mpox prevention and response activities through cooperation, including by introducing accountability mechanisms. (EXTENDED)

• Establish a mechanism to monitor the effectiveness of mpox prevention and response measures implemented at lower administrative levels, so that such measures can be adjusted as needed. (EXTENDED)

• Engage with and strengthen partner organizations for collaboration and support for mpox response, including humanitarian actors in contexts with insecurity, humanitarian corridors, or areas with internal or refugee population displacements and in hosting communities in insecure areas. (EXTENDED, with re-phrasing)
   

Collaborative surveillance

• Enhance mpox surveillance, by increasing the sensitivity of the approaches adopted and ensuring comprehensive geographic coverage. (EXTENDED)

• Expand access to accurate, affordable and available diagnostics to test for mpox, including through strengthening arrangements for the transport of samples, the decentralization of testing and arrangements to differentiate MPXV clades and conduct genomic sequencing. (EXTENDED)

• Identify, monitor and support the contacts of persons with suspected, clinically-diagnosed or laboratory-confirmed mpox to prevent onward transmission. (EXTENDED)

• Scale up efforts to thoroughly investigate cases and outbreaks of mpox to better understand the modes of transmission and transmission risk, and prevent its onward transmission to contacts and communities. (EXTENDED)

• Report to WHO suspected, probable and confirmed cases of mpox in a timely manner and on a weekly basis. (EXTENDED)
   

Safe and scalable clinical care

• Provide clinical, nutritional and psychosocial support for patients with mpox, including, where appropriate and possible, isolation in care centres and/or access to materials and guidance for home-based care. (EXTENDED)

• Develop and implement a plan to expand access to optimized supportive clinical care for all patients with mpox, including children, pregnant women, and persons living with HIV, recognising the association of mpox-related morbidity and mortality in persons living with HIV with untreated or advanced HIV. This includes prompt identification and effective management of endemic co-infections, such as malaria, chickenpox or measles. This also includes offering HIV tests to adult patients who do not know their HIV status and to children as appropriate, testing and treatment for other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) among cases linked to sexual contact and referral to HIV/STIs treatment and care services when indicated. (EXTENDED, with re-phrasing)

• Strengthen health and care workers’ capacity, knowledge and skills in clinical and infection and prevention and control pathways – screening, diagnosis, isolation, environmental cleaning, discharge of patients, including post discharge follow up for suspected and confirmed mpox –, and provide health and care workers with personal protective equipment (PPE). (EXTENDED)

• Strengthen adherence to infection prevention and control (IPC) measures and availability of water, sanitation, hygiene (WASH) and waste management services and infrastructure in healthcare facilities and treatment and care centers to ensure quality healthcare service delivery and protection of health and care workers, caregivers and patients. (EXTENDED, with re-phrasing)
   

International traffic

• Establish or strengthen cross-border collaboration arrangements for surveillance, management and support of suspected cases and contacts of mpox, and for the provision of information to travellers and conveyance operators, without resorting to travel and trade restrictions that unnecessarily impact local, regional or national economies. (EXTENDED)
   

Vaccination

• Continue to prepare for and implement targeted use of vaccine for “Phase 1-Stop the outbreak” (as defined in the WHO Mpox global strategic preparedness and response plan (2025)) through the identification of the lowest administrative level reporting cases (hotspots) and targeting those groups at high risk of mpox exposure to interrupt sustained community transmission. (EXTENDED, with rephrasing and updated reference)

• Develop and implement plans for vaccination in the context of an integrated response at the lowest administrative level reporting cases for people at high risk of exposure (e.g., contacts of cases of all ages, health and frontline workers, and other groups at risk such as those with multiple sexual partners and sex workers in endemic and non-endemic areas). This entails a targeted integrated response, including active surveillance and contact tracing; agile adaptation of immunization strategies and plans to the local context including dose-sparing options (single dose/fractional dosing) in the context of limited availability of vaccines; proactive community engagement to generate and sustain demand for and trust in vaccination; close monitoring of mpox vaccination activities, coverage and adverse events following immunization (AEFI); assessment of vaccine effectiveness; and documenting lessons learned and their implementation. (MODIFIED)
   

Community protection

• Strengthen risk communication and community engagement in affected communities and local workforces for outbreak prevention, response and vaccination strategies, particularly at the lowest administrative levels reporting cases. Key actions include training, mapping high risk and vulnerable populations for tailored interventions, data driven approaches for social listening, community feedback and dialogue, and managing misinformation. This entails, inter alia, communicating effectively the uncertainties and new information regarding the natural history of mpox and modes of transmission, the effectiveness of mpox vaccines and duration of protection following vaccination, and about any clinical trials to which the local population may have access, as appropriate. (EXTENDED, with re-phrasing)

• Address stigma and discrimination of any kind via meaningful community engagement, particularly in health services and during risk communication activities, and through engagement with civil society groups, such as HIV networks. (EXTENDED, with re-phrasing)

• Promote and implement IPC measures and basic WASH and waste management services in household settings, congregate settings (e.g. prisons, internally displaced persons and refugee camps, etc.), schools, points of entry and cross border transit areas. (EXTENDED)
   

Governance and financing

• Galvanize and scale up national funding and explore external opportunities for targeted funding of mpox prevention, readiness and response activities, advocate for release of available funds and take steps to identify potential new funding partners for emergency response. (EXTENDED)

• Optimize the use of resources, in the context of global and local external funding shortfalls, by allocating available resources to the implementation of core mpox response interventions needed in the medium term; maximizing their cost-efficiency through cross-programmatic synergetic approaches; and by engaging partners in resource-sharing arrangements to maintain the delivery of essential health services. (NEW)

• Integrate mpox prevention and response measures, including enhanced surveillance, in existing programmes for prevention, control and treatment of other endemic diseases – especially HIV, as well as STIs, malaria, tuberculosis and other vaccine-preventable diseases, and/or non-communicable diseases – striving to identify activities which will benefit the programmes involved and lead to better health outcomes overall. (EXTENDED)
   

Addressing research gaps

• Invest in addressing outstanding knowledge gaps and in generating evidence, during and after outbreaks, as defined in A coordinated research roadmap – Mpox virus - Immediate research next steps to contribute to control the outbreak (2024), including for vaccine effectiveness in different contexts. (EXTENDED, with re-phrasing)

• Invest in field studies to better understand animal hosts and zoonotic spillover in the areas where MPXV is circulating, in coordination with the animal health sector and One Health partners. (EXTENDED)

• Strengthen and expand use of genomic sequencing to characterize the epidemiology and chains of transmission of MPXV to better inform control measures, particularly regarding the emergence and circulation of new virus strains. (EXTENDED, with re-phrasing)
   

Reporting on the implementation of temporary recommendations

• Report quarterly to WHO on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a revised standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps of the national response. (EXTENDED, with re-phrasing)

 

Nadejda Morarescu, as a MediPIET fellow, led projects on AMR surveillance and stewardship, deepening her expertise and commitment to public health.

WHO warns that the Gaza Strip’s health system is collapsing, with Nasser Medical Complex, the most important referral hospital left in Gaza, and Al-Amal Hospital at risk of becoming non-functional. There are already no hospitals functioning in the north of Gaza.

Nasser and Amal are the last two functioning public hospitals in Khan Younis, where currently most of the population is living. Without them, people will lose access to critical health services.

While these hospitals have not received orders to evacuate patients or staff, they lie within or just outside the evacuation zone announced on 2 June. Israeli authorities have informed the Ministry of Health that access routes leading to both hospitals will be obstructed. As a result, safe access for new patients and staff will be difficult, if not impossible. If the situation further deteriorates, both hospitals are at high risk of becoming non-functional, due to movement restrictions, insecurity, and the inability of WHO and partners to resupply or transfer patients.

Nasser and Al Amal hospitals are operating above their capacity, while people with life-threatening injuries continue to arrive to seek urgent care amid a dire shortage of essential medicines and medical supplies. The hospitals going out of service would have dire consequences for patients in need of surgical care, intensive care, blood bank and transfusion services, cancer care, and dialysis.

Losing the two hospitals would cut 490 beds, reducing the Gaza Strip’s overall hospital bed availability to less than 1400 hospital beds (40% less hospital beds available in the Gaza Strip than before the start of the conflict), for the entire population of 2 million people.

The relentless and systematic decimation of hospitals in Gaza has been going on for too long. It must end immediately. For over 20 months, health workers, WHO, and partners have managed to keep health services partly running despite extreme conditions. But repeated attacks, escalating hostilities, denial of aid, and restricted access have systematically dismantled the health system.

WHO calls for urgent protection of Nasser Medical Complex and Al-Amal Hospital to ensure they remain accessible, functional and safe from attacks and hostilities. Patients seeking refuge and care to save their lives must not risk losing them trying to reach hospitals. Hospitals must never be militarized or targeted.

WHO calls for the delivery of essential medicines and medical supplies into Gaza to be immediately expedited safely and facilitated through all possible routes.

WHO calls for an immediate and lasting ceasefire.

Notes to editors

• Only 17 of Gaza’s 36 hospitals are currently partially functional. Of these, just five, including Nasser Medical Complex and Al-Amal Hospital, are major referral facilities, accounting for 75% of all the Gaza Strip’s hospital beds.
• Nasser Medical Complex is operating at 180% over bed capacity and Al Amal Hospital is at 100%.
• Currently, one national and four international Emergency Medical Teams are deployed at Al-Amal and Nasser hospitals as part of efforts to provide specialized care and strengthen hospital capacity.
• Acute shortages of essential medicines and medical supplies are severely disrupting health services in all hospitals, while about 50 WHO trucks of supplies await at Al-Arish and in the West Bank.

Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) and Listeria infections in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) reached their highest levels in 2023 since the start of EU-wide surveillance in 2007, according to the latest annual epidemiological reports issued today by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).

During 2022, several European countries observed an unusual spike in reported diphtheria cases that mainly affected migrants who had recently arrived in Europe. Recent data from 2025 indicate that at least one of the bacterial strains detected in the 2022 outbreak is also associated with newly reported cases in the region, affecting additional vulnerable groups including people experiencing homelessness.

On 2 June 2025, ECDC welcomed a delegation from the Gulf Health Council and the Gulf Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC).

This week marks one year since dozens of personnel from the United Nations, nongovernmental and civil society organizations, and diplomatic missions were arbitrarily detained by the Houthi de facto authorities in northern Yemen. Others have been detained since as far back as 2021. Today, we reiterate our urgent demand for their immediate and unconditional release.

As of today, 23 UN and five international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) personnel remain arbitrarily detained. Tragically, one UN staff member and another from Save the Children have died in detention. Others have lost loved ones while being held, denied the chance to attend their funerals or say goodbye.   Our arbitrarily detained colleagues have spent at least 365 days – and for some, over 1000 days – isolated from their families, children, husbands, and wives, in flagrant breach of international law. The toll of this detention is also weighing heavily on their families, who continue to endure the unbearable pain of absence and uncertainty as they face another Eid without their loved one.

Nothing can justify their ordeal. They were doing their jobs, helping people in desperate need: people without food, shelter, or adequate health care.

Yemen remains one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with over 19 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, many of whom rely on it for survival. A safe and enabling operating environment for humanitarian operations, including the release of detained personnel, is essential to maintaining and restoring assistance to those in need. Humanitarian workers should never be targeted or detained while carrying out their mandates to serve the people of Yemen.

The prolonged detention of our colleagues has a chilling effect across the international community, undermining support for Yemen and hindering humanitarian response. It has also undermined mediation efforts for lasting peace.

We acknowledge the release of one UN and two NGO personnel and the recent release of an Embassy staff member. We call on the de facto authorities to deliver on their previous commitments, including those made to the Director-General of the World Health Organization during his mission to Sana'a in December 2024.

The UN and INGOs will continue to work through all possible channels to secure the safe and immediate release of those arbitrarily detained.

Signatories:

• Achim Steiner, Administrator, UNDP
• Amitabh Behar, OXFAM International Executive Director
• Audrey Azoulay, Director General of UNESCO
• Catherine Russell, UNICEF Executive Director
• Cindy McCain, WFP Executive Director
• Hans Grundberg, UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen
• Inger Ashing, Chief Executive Officer, Save the Children International
• Michelle Nunn, President and CEO, CARE
• Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of WHO
• Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
  

Between 20 and 22 May 2025, a regional workshop was held in Cairo, Egypt, on the risk-ranking of epidemic-prone diseases.

In 2024-2025, South Sudan experienced its largest ever recorded outbreak of cholera. On 18 December 2024, Ebba Rosendal, Instituto Nacional de Saúde Doutor Ricardo Jorge (INSA), Lisbon, Portugal, and Sebastian von Schreeb, Direção-Geral da Saúde (DGS), Lisbon, Portugal, were deployed to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, through the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN).

WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus praised the commitment shown by the Organization’s Member States which, during nearly two weeks of meetings, adopted historic measures to make the world safer and healthier.

The landmark adoptions of the first global agreement to make the world safer from future pandemics and increase in financial support to the World Health Organization were the highlights of the Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly, which ran from 19–27 May. Immediately after, the WHO Executive Board met for two days, until 29 May, to address the Health Assembly’s outcome, WHO governance reform and the nomination and appointment of regional directors. 

Dr Tedros said Member States demonstrated their commitment to WHO and multilateral action to protect and promote public health. “WHO and many of our Member States and health partners are facing various challenges,” he said. “But the World Health Assembly has sent a clear message: countries want a strong WHO and are committed to working together with WHO to build a healthier, safer and fairer world. These were strong votes of confidence in WHO at this critical time.”

Making the world safer from pandemics

“The Health Assembly’s adoption of the Pandemic Agreement on 20 May was a landmark in the history of WHO and global health,” said Dr Tedros. “Despite many obstacles, and in the face of significant mis- and disinformation, WHO’s Member States have succeeded in negotiating and adopting a legally binding agreement to make the world safer from pandemics.”

The Pandemic Agreement sets out a range of measures to prevent pandemics and strengthen health system resilience, including through improving the rapid sharing of pathogens; ensuring fair, equitable and timely access to vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics; and strengthening technology transfer, financing and supply chains.

Dr Tedros said adoption of the Pandemic Agreement was not the end of the journey, adding that Member States still must negotiate the annex on pathogen access and benefit sharing for adoption at an upcoming Health Assembly. The next step would be for 60 countries to ratify the agreement, including the annex, before it enters into force as an instrument of international law.

“But having watched this process over the past three and a half years, I am confident of two things,” the WHO Director-General said. “First, that Member States will finish the job by May next year (2026), as they have committed to doing; and second, that the deception and distortion will continue.”

In particular, Dr Tedros said while it has been widely acknowledged that the Pandemic Agreement will not infringe on national sovereignty, some quarters will continue to repeat the false claims.

“Let me be clear once again: the Pandemic Agreement will not infringe on national sovereignty, period. And the Pandemic Agreement does not give WHO any powers, period,” Dr Tedros said. “WHO’s job is to make recommendations to governments, but what governments do with those recommendations is entirely up to them. WHO is not even a party to the Agreement. This is an agreement between sovereign nations, and it will be ratified and implemented by sovereign nations that choose to do so. The intentional distortion of the Pandemic Agreement as ceding power to WHO must stop.”

Assessed contributions increase

The Assembly’s other major outcome was the approval of WHO’s 2026–27 Programme Budget, including the next 20% increase in assessed contributions, adding US$ 90 million in fully predictable and flexible funds to WHO’s income each year. In 2022, Member States agreed to increase assessed contributions progressively to 50% of our base budget, from just 16% at the time. This rise is the cornerstone of WHO’s transformation of its approach to sustainable financing by diversifying its donor base and receiving increased support from all of its Member States towards WHO’s core budget and programme of work.

“This is another major step towards making WHO less dependent on earmarked voluntary funds from a handful of traditional donors,” said Dr Tedros. “WHO also held a pledging event at which Member States and philanthropic donors committed at least US$ 210 million in additional funding to the WHO Investment Round.”

In addition to these two major achievements, the Health Assembly also celebrated several countries for eliminating diseases, and eliminating industrial trans-fat from their manufactured food supplies.

WHO Member States also adopted several important resolutions, reflecting WHO’s vast mission and mandate, including a new target to halve the health impacts of air pollution by 2040; new targets for nutrition in mothers and young children; to strengthen regulation of digital marketing of formula milk and baby foods; and a new global strategy for traditional medicine.

Countries for the first time also adopted resolutions on lung health and kidney health, and for a lead-free future, and established World Cervical Cancer Day and World Prematurity Day as official WHO health campaigns. Resolutions on digital health, Guinea worm disease, health financing, the health and care workforce, medical imaging, nursing and midwifery, rare diseases, sensory impairment, skin diseases, social connection and more were also adopted.

Today, the World Health Organization (WHO) published its first-ever position paper on immunization products to protect infants against respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) – the leading cause of acute lower respiratory infections in children globally.

Every year, RSV causes about 100 000 deaths and over 3.6 million hospitalizations in children under the age of 5 years worldwide. About half of these deaths occur in infants younger than 6 months of age. The vast majority (97%) of RSV deaths in infants occur in low- and middle-income countries where there is limited access to supportive medical care, such as oxygen or hydration.

Published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record (WER), the position paper outlines WHO recommendations for two immunization products: a maternal vaccine that can be given to pregnant women in their third trimester to protect their infant and a long-acting monoclonal antibody that can be administered to infants from birth, just before or during the RSV season.

“RSV is an incredibly infectious virus that infects people of all ages, but is especially harmful to infants, particularly those born premature, when they are most vulnerable to severe disease,” says Dr Kate O’Brien, Director of Immunization, Vaccines, and Biologicals at WHO. “The WHO-recommended RSV immunization products can transform the fight against severe RSV disease, dramatically reduce hospitalizations, and deaths, ultimately saving many infant lives globally.”

RSV usually causes mild symptoms similar to the common cold, including runny nose, cough and fever. However, it can lead to serious complications – including pneumonia and bronchiolitis – in infants, young children, older adults and those with compromised immune systems or underlying health conditions.

Two immunization products to protect against RSV

In response to the global burden of severe RSV disease among infants, WHO recommends that all countries introduce either the maternal vaccine, RSVpreF, or the monoclonal antibody, nirsevimab depending on the feasibility of implementation within each country’s existing health system, cost-effectiveness and anticipated coverage. Both products were recommended by the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) for global implementation in September 2024. In addition, the maternal vaccine received WHO prequalification in March 2025, allowing it to be purchased by UN agencies.

WHO recommends that the maternal vaccine be given to pregnant women during the third trimester of pregnancy, from week 28 onwards, to optimize for the adequate transfer of antibodies to their baby. The vaccine may be given during routine antenatal care, including at one of the 5 WHO-recommended antenatal care visits in the third trimester or any additional medical consultations.

The second WHO-recommended immunization product, nirsevimab, is given as a single injection of monoclonal antibodies that starts protecting babies against RSV within a week of administration and lasts for at least 5 months, which can cover the entire RSV season in countries with RSV seasonality.

WHO recommends that infants receive a single dose of nirsevimab right after birth or before being discharged from a birthing facility. If not administered at birth, the monoclonal antibody can be given during the baby's first health visit. If a country decides to administer the product only during the RSV season rather than year-round, a single dose can also be given to older infants just before entering their first RSV season.

The greatest impact on severe RSV disease will be achieved by administering the monoclonal antibody to infants under 6 months of age. However, there is still a potential benefit among infants up to 12 months of age.

WHO regularly issues updated position papers on vaccines, combinations of vaccines and other immunization products against diseases that have major public health impact. These papers focus primarily on the use of vaccines in large-scale vaccination programmes. The new position paper aims to inform national public health policymakers and immunization programme managers on the use of RSV immunization products in their national programmes, as well as national and international funding agencies.